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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In their Complaint challenging the New York State Department of Health
Ventilator Allocation Guidelines (“Guidelines”), which explicitly provide for the
reallocation of their life-sustaining personal medical equipment,1 Chronic
Ventilator Users alleged that the Guidelines deprived them of a nondiscriminatory
emergency preparedness plan in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”). (A-11 ¶ 2, A-33 ¶ 151). That complaint, and the facts alleged in support
of it, must be accepted as true at this stage of litigation.
Chronic Ventilator Users are actually and imminently injured by the Statecreated emergency preparedness plan and their injury is redressable by the State.
The State contends that Chronic Ventilator Users “simply must wait until there is a
concrete basis to allege that the plan may actually be implemented.” Appellees’ Br.
3. However, Chronic Ventilator Users cannot risk their lives to challenge the
discriminatory Guidelines, nor does the law require them to wait.
Furthermore, the State cannot distance itself from the Task Force it
conceptualized and convened, and upon which the Commissioner of the State
Department of Health serves as chair in order to avoid responsibility for the

The State takes issue with Chronic Ventilator Users’ claim that the State “has specifically
directed the removal and reallocation of Chronic Ventilator Users’ life-sustaining devices in an
emergency.” Appellees’ Br. 29. However, a plain reading of the Guidelines themselves confirms
this fact. (A-99, A-101).
1

1
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Guidelines. As such, the State is responsible for and capable of granting Chronic
Ventilator Users’ request to amend or rescind the Guidelines.
Additionally, Chronic Ventilator Users’ claims are constitutionally and
prudentially ripe and fit for judicial review. The current Guidelines, as published
on the New York State Department of Health Website, pose a current, ongoing
hardship to Chronic Ventilator Users, particularly in light of the ongoing Covid-19
pandemic. There is no time more urgent than now to have clear, effective and
nondiscriminatory emergency preparedness plans.
Finally, Chronic Ventilator Users’ claims are timely under the continuing
violation doctrine because they are subject to an ongoing discriminatory policy.
Alternatively, the repeated violations doctrine applies to Chronic Ventilator Users’
claims because they are injured each day the discriminatory policy remains in
place.

2

Case 21-2212, Document 102, 04/18/2022, 3298899, Page9 of 32

ARGUMENT
POINT I
CHRONIC VENTILATOR USERS HAVE STANDING
A. CHRONIC VENTILATOR USERS HAVE ALLEGED A
COGNIZABLE INJURY IN FACT AND THEIR WELL-PLED FACTS
MUST BE ACCEPTED AS TRUE AT THIS STAGE OF LITIGATION
To establish standing, a plaintiff must suffer an injury-in-fact, that is (1) the
“invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized,” and
“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” (2) “fairly…traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant,” and (3) likely redressable by a favorable
decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). It is wellestablished that a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true. See
Levy v. Southbrook Intern. Invs., Ltd., 263 F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 2001). Chronic
Ventilator Users have pled that the Guidelines are the State’s emergency
preparedness plan.2 (A-11 ¶¶ 1-2). The Guidelines direct the removal of ventilators
during a pandemic. (A-18 ¶ 45). Hospitals are inclined to use the Guidelines (A-16
¶ 34), and Chronic Ventilator Users have been deterred from seeking medical care

during an emergency. (A-20 – A-24 ¶¶ 60, 73, 81, 96). Chronic Ventilator Users’

Despite the State’s quarrel with Chronic Ventilator Users’ amicus stating that the Guidelines
represent that they are “the State of New York’s plan for how ventilators are to be allocated
during a pandemic,” Appellees’ Br. 26 n.13, in the Letter from the Commissioner of Health that
appears at the start of the document, the Guidelines characterize themselves as “part of our
emergency preparedness efforts.” (A-57).
2

3
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claims satisfy all three elements of the standing test, and the State cannot dispute
Chronic Ventilator Users’ facts.
B. CHRONIC VENTILATOR USERS’ INJURY IS ACTUAL AND
IMMINENT, NOT CONJECTURAL OR HYPOTHETICAL
Chronic Ventilator Users allege that the State-created Guidelines deprive
them of a nondiscriminatory emergency preparedness plan – a benefit afforded to
non-disabled citizens – in violation of the ADA, see Brooklyn Ctr. for Indep. of the
Disabled v. Bloomberg, 290 F.R.D. 409, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act.3 Despite
acknowledging this allegation of injury, the State contends that Chronic Ventilator
Users “have not alleged any Article III injury.” Appellees’ Br. 22. While the State
argues that Chronic Ventilator Users have not established “an actual or imminent
loss of access” to their ventilators, Appellees’ Br. 22, the relevant injury is the
deprivation of a nondiscriminatory emergency preparedness plan. That injury is not
just “imminent,” but present and ongoing. See also Logerfo v. City of New York,
No. 17-CV-00010-JMA-AYS, 2020 WL 2307649, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2020)
(“Indeed, the Court ‘would be in no better position later than now to resolve the
claims presented’ because ‘to conclude otherwise would be perverse, as it would

3

See, e.g., McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 640 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Vega-Ruiz v.
Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 17-CV-1804-LTS-SDA, 2019 WL 3080906 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. July 15,
2019) (describing the pleading analysis for Section 1557, Section 504, and ADA claims as being
treated identically).
4
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mean that [plaintiff] could bring [her] claim only after’ suffering an extreme
emergency”) (internal citations omitted)); Bauer v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 637
(2d Cir. 2003) (“The more drastic the injury that government action makes more
likely, the lesser the increment in probability necessary to establish standing.”).
The State argues that “a pre-enforcement challenge cannot be based on an
‘imaginary or speculative’ fear of ultimate harm.” Appellees’ Br. 23, (citing
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).
However, as Chronic Ventilator Users have explained, their harm is not
speculative. They are injured by the lack of a nondiscriminatory emergency
preparedness plan. Chronic Ventilator Users have sufficiently alleged that harm.
C. CHRONIC VENTILATOR USERS CANNOT AND NEED NOT WAIT
FOR THE GUIDELINES TO BE IMPLEMENTED
The State attempts to introduce facts about the implementation of the
Guidelines. Appellees’ Br. 25. However, the law does not permit the State to plead
their own facts in the context of a motion to dismiss. See Ferrante v. Capitol Reg’l
Educ. Council, No. 3:14-CV-00392-VLB, 2015 WL 1445206, at *6 (D. Conn,
Mar. 30, 2015) (finding that it was impermissible to attempt to introduce facts into
defendant’s motion to dismiss, as plaintiff’s complaint did not allege those facts);
see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1424–25 (3d
Cir. 1997) (finding that the district court’s reliance on defendant’s proffered
affidavit is improper on a motion to dismiss where the court cannot look beyond
5
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the facts alleged in the complaint). The State contends that Chronic Ventilator
Users have not alleged a basis to conclude that the State adopted or implemented
the Guidelines. Appellees’ Br. 25. Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that
Chronic Ventilator Users were required to make such an allegation, a fact-based
question about the internal workings of the State is best-suited for discovery—not
the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Minto v. Molloy Coll., No. 16-CV-276KAM-AYS, 2021 WL 1394329, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2021), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 16-CV-276, 2021 WL 804386 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3,
2021) (declining to opine on defendants’ critique of plaintiffs’ facts and stating that
“fact-finding is improper in the context of a motion to dismiss.”).
The State agrees that “a plaintiff is not required to expose himself to actual
injury before bringing suit.” Appellees’ Br. 23. Yet, it does so while
simultaneously arguing that Chronic Ventilator Users “simply must wait” for the
Guidelines to be implemented in order to challenge them. Appellees’ Br. 3. This
argument refuses to acknowledge that the “actual or imminent loss of access” to
their ventilators, which the State contends is required for standing, would mean an
actual or imminent loss of Chronic Ventilator Users’ lives.
Furthermore, the State contends that Chronic Ventilator Users’ reliance on
American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper (“ACLU”), 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir.
2015), is misplaced and that the Court in ACLU found standing because the

6
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allegedly unlawful policy had already been applied to the plaintiffs. Appellees’ Br.
24 n.11. However, the government in ACLU argued that the injury stemmed from
the government’s reviewing the information collected. 785 F.3d at 801. The
plaintiffs, on the other hand, challenged the program itself—the collecting of data.
Id. The court agreed with the plaintiffs. Id. Similarly, Chronic Ventilator Users are
challenging the Guidelines themselves as facially discriminatory – not the
application of the Guidelines.
D. CHRONIC VENTILATOR USERS’ CLAIMS ARE FAIRLY
TRACEABLE TO THE STATE
1. THE STATE CANNOT DISTANCE ITSELF FROM THE
GUIDELINES
Chronic Ventilator Users’ injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action
of [the State],” and not as the State contends, Appellees’ Br. 30, “the result of the
independent action of some third party.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The State spends
much of its filing attempting to put as much distance as possible between itself and
the Guidelines, alleging that the document is the product of the New York State
Task Force on Life and the Law (“Task Force”), not the State itself. Appellees’ Br.
4-6, 30.
The State and the Task Force are joint collaborators with respect to the
development of the Guidelines. For support for these statements, the Court need
only look to the Guidelines themselves. (A-54). The New York State Department

7
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of Health is listed immediately after the New York State Task Force on Life and
the Law as an author, then-Commissioner of the Department of Health Howard
Zucker is listed as a member of the Task Force, and the “Letter from the
Commissioner of Health” reads “The Department [of Health], together with the
New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, is releasing the 2015 Ventilator
Allocation Guidelines.” (A-54 – A-57) (emphasis added). The Guidelines go on to
state:
“The Department of Health is empowered to issue voluntary, nonbinding guidelines for health care working and facilities; such
guidelines are readily implemented and provide hospitals with an
ethical and clinical framework for decision-making.” (A-67)
(emphasis added);
“Voluntary guidelines issued by the Department of Health for
ventilator allocation provide evidence for an acceptable modified
medical standard of care during the dire circumstances of a
pandemic.” (A-67) (emphasis added);
“The Department of Health and the Task Force will continue to
publicize the Guidelines….” (A-96) (emphasis added);
“[T]he New York State Task Force on Life and the Law (the Task
Force) and the New York State Department of Health (the Department
of Health), undertook a comprehensive project to draft clinically
sound and ethical ventilator allocation guidelines (Pediatric
Guidelines).” (A-141) (emphasis added);
“[T]he Task Force and the Department of Health undertook a
comprehensive project to develop clinically sound and ethical
guidance as part of an undertaking to expand the Ventilator Allocation
Guidelines (the Guidelines)” (A-152) (emphasis added).

8
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Furthermore, this type of state action by a non-state entity is arguably
analogous to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the
government can be held liable for the actions of private entities performing
state functions. See, e.g., Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308,
312-13 (2d Cir. 2003). “In order to satisfy the state action requirement, the
allegedly unconstitutional conduct must be fairly attributable to the state.”
Id. (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)). This
happens “if there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged
action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.” Id. (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (internal quotations omitted)).
“State action may properly be found where the state exercises ‘coercive
power’ over, is ‘entwined in [the] management or control’ of, or provides
‘significant encouragement, either overt or covert’ to, a private actor, or
where the private actor ‘operates as a willful participant in joint activity with
the State or its agents,’ is ‘controlled by an agency of the State,’ has been
delegated a ‘public function’ by the state, or is ‘entwined with governmental
policies.’” Id. (citing Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295). Thus, the State and
the Task Force are clearly inextricably intertwined.

9
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E. THE STATE’S REDRESSABILITY ARGUMENT IS WAIVED
AND INCORRECT
1. THE STATE’S REDRESSABILITY ARGUMENT IS
WAIVED
By its own admission, the State – for the first time ever – argues that
Chronic Ventilator Users’ claims are not redressable by the State “because the
guidelines were not created by the Governor or by the DOH Commissioner alone,
but by the Task Force.” Appellees’ Br. 29–30 (emphasis added). As a result, the
State claims that “it is the Task Force, not defendants, that has the power to
withdraw or to amend its publications.” Appellees’ Br. 30. It asserts that it can
raise this argument for the first time on appeal because it is an issue of subject
matter jurisdiction. Appellees’ Br. 29. However, this limited statement of the law
ignores that generally “a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not
passed upon below,” and “retain[s] broad discretion” on what matters it will
consider. Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Ferrante,
No. 3:14-CV-00392-VLB, 2015 WL 1445206, at *6 (“The court does not consider
this argument, as it is impermissibly raised for the first time in defendant’s reply
brief, and there is no reason why it could not have been raised in the initial motion
to dismiss”).
Additionally, a court is more likely to hear an issue for the first time on
appeal “where the issue is purely legal and there is no need for additional fact-

10
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finding.” Baker, 239 F.3d at 420, The State’s argument here is entirely based on
what it alleges is the relationship between the named State entities and the Task
Force. Chronic Ventilator Users would require additional factfinding in order to
establish the veracity of these allegations. It is not a matter of pure law that there is
no relationship between the State and the Task Force sufficient to enable the State
to redress Chronic Ventilator Users’ injury. Thus, this argument should be
waived.
Alternatively, should the Court choose to exercise its discretion to consider
this argument, the State should not be permitted to avoid responsibility for the
Guidelines. It cites only the executive order that first established the Task Force in
1984 in support of its newfound position that only the Task Force can withdraw or
amend the Guidelines. Appellees’ Br. 30. However, the order does not discuss
amendment or withdrawal at all. See 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 4.56. Thus, the State can
address the claims in this litigation and provide the requested relief. The State
created these Guidelines, and the State can amend them.
2. CHRONIC VENTILATOR USERS’ INJURY DOES NOT
DEPEND ON THE ACTIONS OF INDEPENDENT THIRD
PARTIES
Chronic Ventilator Users’ injury is not dependent on speculation concerning
the judgment of independent decisionmakers. Appellees’ Br. 27. Courts have found
that “[t]here is no redressability where such depends on an independent actor who

11
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retains broad and legitimate discretion [that] the courts cannot presume either to
control or to predict.” Neary v. Weichert, 489 F. Supp. 3d 55, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)
(emphasis added) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Here, in contrast, the
Guidelines themselves acknowledge that healthcare providers want to follow them,
(A-91), and healthcare providers have indicated the same. (A-16). This Court can,
and should, predict that healthcare facilities would follow guidance issued by
DOH, the entity that regulates them. Thus, this case “does not rest on mere
speculation about the decisions of third parties” and instead relies on the
“predictable effect of Government action on the decisions of third parties.” Dep’t
of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566 (2019).
The Guidelines explicitly acknowledge that hospitals have “expressed a
preference for State guidance over drafting their own policies,” and use this fact as
a basis to “strongly recommend” that all health care providers adopt and follow the
Guidelines in a pandemic. (A-265). The State cannot have it both ways: it cannot
both promulgate discriminatory Guidelines that it expects health care providers
will follow and then shield itself from liability under the guise that they are merely
guidelines.
Alternatively, if as the State contends, the Guidelines have no chance of ever
being implemented and it has “repeatedly and publicly disavowed” this possibility,
Appellees’ Br. 13, it is questionable why the State would leave it to chance that a

12
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health care provider would follow the Guidelines published by the Department of
Health. Additionally, the State offers no explanation as to why it will not afford
Chronic Ventilator Users their requested relief in order to avoid this occurrence:
an unequivocal statement that Chronic Ventilator Users will never be extubated
without having another ventilator readily available for their use, as PlaintiffAppellant Disability Rights New York previously requested. (A-28).
POINT II
CHRONIC VENTILATOR USERS’ CLAIMS ARE RIPE
Chronic Ventilator Users’ claims are both constitutionally and prudentially
ripe for review.4
A. CHRONIC VENTILATOR USERS’ CLAIMS ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY RIPE
Chronic Ventilator Users’ claims are constitutionally ripe for the same
reasons they have standing.5 See Davis v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 689 F.
App'x 665, 668 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Constitutional ripeness, which is an overlapping

Contrary to the State’s claims, see Appellees’ Br. 33 n.18, Chronic Ventilator Users have never
suggested that “ripeness analysis…is an either-or matter.” Appellants’ Br. 19 (emphasis added)
(“The same legal analysis that leads to the conclusion that Chronic Ventilator Users have
standing leads to the conclusion that their claims are constitutionally ripe…. In addition, Chronic
Ventilator Users maintain that the proper inquiry for analyzing their claims is prudential
ripeness.”).
4

5

Thus, Chronic Ventilator Users incorporate their standing arguments, see supra p. 3, for the
purposes of their constitutional ripeness argument.
13
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doctrine, is best thought of as a specific application of the actual injury aspect of
Article III standing.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
B. THE GUIDELINES ARE A FINAL POLICY DOCUMENT FIT
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Chronic Ventilator Users’ claims are also prudentially ripe. Prudential
ripeness concerns “when a court should entertain a lawsuit, not whether it may
entertain the suit. The prudential ripeness inquiry focuses on ‘whether the alleged
policy at this stage is sufficiently definite and clear to permit sound review by this
Court[.]’” Roman Cath. Archdiocese of New York v. Sebelius, 907 F. Supp. 2d 310,
333 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting New York Civ. Liberties Union v. Grandeau, 528
F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2008)).
The State argues that the Guidelines are “ill-suited for judicial review at this
time” because the Guidelines state that they are “by no means final” and are
“intended to be updated and revised[.]” Appellees’ Br. 34. However, the mere fact
that the Guidelines could be updated eventually does not mean they are not final.
See Scenic Am., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 836 F.3d 42, 56 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (“Although the Guidance does state that the [agency] ‘may provide further
guidance in the future as a result of additional information’ [it] might receive . . .
The fact that a regulation might be interpreted again at some point in the
indeterminate future cannot, by itself, prevent the initial interpretation from being
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final”). It also does not prevent Chronic Ventilator Users from challenging them
now.
Furthermore, while the State argues that it is “unnecessary” to adjudicate
Chronic Ventilator Users’ claims now, Chronic Ventilator Users contend that it is
necessary because they wrote a letter and filed an administrative complaint before
filing suit, and the State refused to address their concerns through any other
medium.6
Next, the State disputes Chronic Ventilator Users’ argument that their claims
are ripe because they are facially discriminatory. Appellees’ Br. 35. The State cites
Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 812 (2003), in support
of its contention that a facial challenge that presents a purely legal question is
unripe in the absence of a concrete dispute. Appellees’ Br. 35. However, the Court
in National Park Hospital Association held that although the issue presented was a
purely legal issue, “further factual development would significantly [aid the court
in deciding] the legal issues presented.” Id. at 812 (internal citation and quotations
omitted). On the contrary, no further factual development is necessary – or, for that

While the State asserts without citation that Plaintiff-Appellant Disability Rights New York’s
complaint with the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
was dismissed via an unpublished letter, Appellees’ Br. 15, n.8, Disability Rights New York
never received notice of dismissal or a copy of a letter denoting the same.
6
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matter, permitted – at this motion to dismiss stage to assist the Court in its decision
with respect to Chronic Ventilator Users’ claims.
Finally, the State asserts that Chronic Ventilator Users “misread” the law
review article in which several of the Guidelines’ authors suggest that the Task
Force purposefully crafted the Guidelines as guidelines in order to avoid a legal
challenge. Appellees’ Br. 34 n. 19. However, Chronic Ventilator Users stand by
their interpretation.7
The State mistakenly relies on Paraquad, Inc. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 259
F.3d 956, 958-60 (8th Cir. 2001) to argue that the Guidelines are a “nonfinal
draft,” Appellees’ Br. 35. In Paraquad, plaintiffs challenged a housing plan which
was not complete because “demolition [had] not yet started, drawings [were] still
in the preliminary phase, and no new construction ha[d] begun.” Id. at 959. In
contrast, the Guidelines were published in November 2015. (A-12). They detail
considerable and wide-ranging public outreach efforts made prior to their

7

See Valerie Gutmann Koch, J.D. & Beth E. Roxland, J.D., M. Bioethics, Unique Proposals for
Limiting Legal Liability and Encouraging Adherence to Ventilator Allocation Guidelines in an
Influenza Pandemic, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 467, 484–85 (2013) (“However, proof of
compliance with the Guidelines might still constitute presumptive (rebuttable) or non-conclusive
evidence of the legal standard of care - a defense to a claim of negligence. Guidelines for
appropriate treatment protocols during public health emergencies developed by organizations
may be ‘useful in litigation for the purpose of determining whether health professionals acted
appropriately and are entitled to immunity.’ Thus, the Guidelines may serve as departmentally
promulgated ‘soft law,’ providing strong evidence of an established standard of care that could
reasonably be expected of health care providers in a disaster emergency”) (internal citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
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finalization, including publication of the 2007 Draft Guidelines in the State
Register and on the Department of Health’s website with instructions on how to
submit comments, presenting the Draft Guidelines at medical and bar associations
and community meetings, and soliciting public comments at the national level. (A80-82). The Guidelines are published on the Department of Health’s website. (A12). The Department is no longer accepting public comment, and it has declined to
make changes to the Guidelines when asked. (A-28). Thus, the Guidelines are a
final document fit for judicial review.
POINT III
CHRONIC VENTILATOR USERS’ CLAIMS ARE NOT TIME BARRED
A. CHRONIC VENTILATOR USERS ALLEGED AN ONGOING
DISCRIMINATORY POLICY UNDER THE CONTINUING
VIOLATIONS DOCTRINE
The State claims that Chronic Ventilator Users did not allege that the State
engaged in any non-time-barred acts of discrimination in furtherance of their
discriminatory policy. Appellees’ Br. 38. This is incorrect. First, at the motion to
dismiss stage, Chronic Ventilator Users are only required to allege the existence of
a discriminatory policy in order for the continuing violations doctrine to apply.
Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding it was
“premature” to dismiss based on continuing violation theory because a “mere
allegation of the existence of such a continuing policy would be sufficient…”); see
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also Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 362 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding that
requiring the plaintiff to show a formal policy or widespread discrimination was
premature because the plaintiff had not had an opportunity to conduct discovery).
Chronic Ventilator Users have alleged that the Guidelines are a discriminatory
policy. (A-11 ¶ 2, A-33 ¶¶ 151). Nevertheless, Chronic Ventilator Users still
alleged the existence of a non-time-barred act of discrimination in furtherance of
the discriminatory policy. Chronic Ventilator Users alleged that they wrote a letter
to then-Governor Cuomo in March of 2020 asking that he issue an unequivocal
statement that Chronic Ventilator Users would not have their ventilators taken
without another one being readily available for their use, and the Governor did not
respond. (A-28). These allegations are more than sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. Harris, 186 F.3d at 250.
The State contends that “inaction or acquiescence” is not enough to qualify
as a non-time-barred act in furtherance of a discriminatory policy. Appellees’ Br.
38. However, the State primarily relies on out-of-circuit cases in support of this
contention. Appellees’ Br. 38-9. It cites only one Second Circuit case in support of
this point, Appellees’ Br. 47. However, this Court’s precedents overwhelmingly
suggest otherwise. See, e.g., Harris, 186 F.3d at 250 (holding it was possible a
plaintiff could demonstrate some discriminatory act that did occur within the
limitations period because it was unclear whether the failure-to-promote was a one-
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time decision or whether plaintiff’s superiors continuously failed to act thus
furthering a continuing discriminatory policy); see also Fitzgerald, 251 F.3d at 364
(stating that the Postmaster’s inaction in the face of plaintiff’s complaints could
demonstrate an ongoing policy of permitting sexual harassment); Id. at 362 (the
continuing violation doctrine applies where discrimination has persisted
“unremedied for so long” such that “inaction may reasonably be viewed as
tantamount to a policy or practice of tolerating such discrimination.”); Shomo v.
City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 182 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the complaint
alleged an ongoing discriminatory policy where Department of Corrections
medical and security staff failed to assist plaintiff with daily living activities, failed
to transfer him to special infirmary housing, and failed to provide him with
recommended treatments); Lucente v. County of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 309 (2d Cir.
2020) (holding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an ongoing discriminatory policy
of “ignoring and/or inadequately addressing” an officer’s sexual misconduct
towards incarcerated women).
The State also cites DeSuze v. Ammon, 990 F.3d 264, 271-72 (2d Cir. 2021)
in support of its claim that “merely lingering effects of past action” are insufficient
to trigger the continuing violations doctrine. Appellees’ Br. 38. In DeSuze,
residents of an affordable housing complex challenged the municipal and federal
approval of their landlord’s application for rent increases. Id. at 267. The plaintiffs
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filed their lawsuit a decade after the rent increases were approved and argued that
their claims were timely under the continuing violations doctrine. Id. at 267. This
Court found that the continuing violations doctrine did not apply because “each of
[the plaintiff’s claims] accrued independently through a discrete approval process,
and each approval occurred more than three years before the Tenants filed suit[.]”
Id. at 272 (emphasis added). Therefore, a continuing violation “‘[could not] be
established merely because the [plaintiff] continues to feel the effects of a timebarred…act.’” Id. at 272 (quoting Harris, 186 F.3d at 250).
In contrast, Chronic Ventilator Users did not have multiple, separate
approval processes during which to file this lawsuit. Thus, DeSuze does not apply
here. Chronic Ventilator Users challenged the Guidelines when their risk of being
used was no longer remote due to the ongoing global pandemic and after giving the
State an opportunity to address their concerns without litigation. Nevertheless, the
State chastises Chronic Ventilator Users for both filing their claims prematurely
and filing their claims too late. Similarly, the State criticizes Plaintiff Not Dead Yet
for taking “no legal action” despite knowing about the Guidelines since they were
published in 2015. Appellees’ Br. 14 n.7. The State’s rationale would leave
Chronic Ventilator Users with no recourse.
The State also cites Pulte Homes of N.Y. LLC v. Town of Carmel, 736 F.
App’x 291, 293-94 (2d Cir. 2018) in support of its argument that a government
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official’s refusal to address some preexisting alleged harm is not a new affirmative
act for purposes of the continuing violation doctrine. Appellees’ Br. 40. However,
Pulte does not hold that “a government official’s refusal to address some
preexisting alleged harm is not a new affirmative act.” Appellees’ Br. 40; See Pulte
Homes of N.Y. LLC, 736 F. App’x 291,at 293-94. Furthermore, the purported
“government action” at issue in Pulte is a town’s refusal to return construction fees
assessed on a developer’s housing complex. Id. at 292-93. The continuing
violations doctrine applies “upon a showing of compelling circumstances.”
Remigio v. Kelly, No. 04-CIV-1877-JGK-MHD, 2005 WL 1950138, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2005) (citing Nakis v. Potter, No. 01-CIV-10047-HBP, 2004
WL 2903718, at n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.15, 2004) (internal quotations omitted)). A
compelling circumstance exists where, as here, “there is a[n] express, openly
espoused policy [that is] alleged to be discriminatory.” Remigio, No. 04-CIV-1877JGK-MHD, 2005 WL 1950138, at *8 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
The “compelling circumstance” of the State’s refusal to address a plan providing
for the reallocation of Chronic Ventilator Users’ personal life-sustaining devices is
not comparable to a town’s refusal to return developer fees. Thus, Pulte does not
apply.
Finally, the State incorrectly states that Harris, does not apply to Chronic
Ventilator Users’ claims because “a complaint ‘must allege both the existence of
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an ongoing policy of discrimination and some non-time-barred acts taken in
furtherance of that policy’” and that Chronic Ventilator Users’ complaint “does not
meet this requirement.” Appellees’ Br. 39 (emphasis supplied in original) (internal
citation omitted). Chronic Ventilator Users have alleged both that the Guidelines
are an ongoing discriminatory policy and that the State committed a non-timebarred act in furtherance of that discriminatory policy when it did not respond to
Chronic Ventilator Users’ letter. (A-28). Thus, the continuing violation doctrine
applies to Not Dead Yet and all Chronic Ventilator Users’ claims.
B. CHRONIC VENTILATOR USERS’ CLAIMS ARE TIMELY UNDER
THE REPEATED VIOLATIONS DOCTRINE AND ARE NOT
WAIVED.
First, while admittedly and simultaneously waiving an argument that is
central to the resolution of this matter by raising it for the first time in reply on
appeal, see supra pp. 9-10 the State contends that Chronic Ventilator Users waived
the repeated violations doctrine by failing to raise it in the district court. Appellees’
Br. 41. However, as Chronic Ventilator Users previously stated, federal appellate
courts “retain broad discretion to consider issues not raised initially in the District
Court,” and are “more likely to exercise…discretion…” where the issue is purely
legal and there is no need for additional fact-finding.’” Baker, 239 F.3d at 420.
Unlike the State’s redressability argument, which depends, at least in part, on the
specific nature of the relationship between the State and the Task Force, whether
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the repeated violations doctrine applies to Chronic Ventilator Users’ claim of
discrimination based on being deprived of the benefit of a nondiscriminatory
emergency preparedness plan is just such the pure question of law that is suitable
for the exercise of federal appellate discretion.
The State next argues that Chronic Ventilator Users “never explain” how the
Guidelines constitute a repeated violation. Appellees’ Br. 41. However, as Chronic
Ventilator Users have previously stated, Appellants’ Br. 25, “[a] public entity
repeatedly violates [the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA)] each
day that it fails to remedy a non-compliant service, program, or activity.” Hamer,
924 F.3d at 1103. Thus, “a qualified individual with a disability is excluded from
the participation in, denied the benefits of, and subjected to discrimination under
the service, program, or activity each day that she is deterred from utilizing it due
to its non-compliance.” Id.
The plaintiff in Hamer was a wheelchair user who alleged that he was
denied access to many of the City’s sidewalks and curb cuts because they did not
comply with Title II of the ADA and Section 504. Id. at 1097.
Similarly, Chronic Ventilator Users have alleged that they are denied access
to a nondiscriminatory emergency preparedness plan in violation of Title II of the
ADA and Section 504. Chronic Ventilator Users are injured each day that the
discriminatory Guidelines are in effect. Just as the City in Hamer repeatedly
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violated the ADA and Section 504 each day that it failed to bring the City’s curb
cuts and sidewalks into compliance, 924 F.3d at 1103, the State repeatedly violates
the ADA and Section 504 each day that it fails to amend or rescind the
discriminatory Guidelines.
Finally, the State attempts to argue that the repeated violations doctrine does
not apply to Chronic Ventilator Users’ claims because the Guidelines are not the
law or policy of the State. Appellees’ Br. 42. Therefore, the State contends the
Guidelines do not exclude Chronic Ventilator Users from any state program.
Appellees’ Br. 42. Ironically, it does this while simultaneously opening its brief by
describing the Guidelines as “a policy recommendation for the Legislature and the
Executive Branch to consider as they develop law and regulations to guide the
public health response,” Appellees’ Br. 1. Moreover, as Chronic Ventilator Users
have previously stated, the State cannot effectively distance itself from
responsibility for the Guidelines that it created and encourages hospitals to follow.
See supra pp. 7,11. Thus, this argument fails, and the repeated violations doctrine
applies to Chronic Ventilator Users’ claims.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, as well as the arguments put forth in Appellants’
brief filed on December 27, 2021, Chronic Ventilator Users’ claims have standing,
are ripe for judicial review, and are not time barred. Chronic Ventilator Users
respectfully request that the judgment below be reversed, the Complaint be
reinstated, and this action proceed to a determination of the merits of Chronic
Ventilator Users’ claims.
Dated: April 18, 2022
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